Encryption Services Help Criminals Involved With Hurting Children
Lock Out the FBI for $200
Experts: Encryption Is Easy Way to Keep Prying Eyes Out of Your Hard Drive
By ASHLEY PHILLIPS and SCOTT MICHELS
Feb. 11, 2008
abcnews.go.com
The widespread belief that any database, hard drive or electronic device can be hacked was disproved when a man accused of having child pornography on his computer managed to keep federal authorities out of his hard drive for more than a year — for the price of an average cell phone.
That computer protection used by the suspect is easy to obtain, even common on most computers, and, according to security experts, is almost impossible to breach, even for the FBI.
On Dec. 17, 2006, Sebastien Boucher was stopped by border patrol inspectors while crossing from Canada into Vermont. An inspector found a laptop in his car, which Boucher admitted belonged to him, according to an affidavit from an Immigration and Customs Enforcement agent.
After Boucher gave the agents access to his computer, they saw videos and file names that appeared to show pornography involving pre-teens, including one labeled "Two-year-old being raped during diaper change." Boucher, a Canadian citizen who is a lawful U.S. permanent resident, said he didn't know if his computer had child pornography because he could not check his temporary Internet files, the affidavit says. He was arrested and charged with transportation of child pornography, a felony that carries up to 20 years in prison.
But after Boucher's arrest, an investigator from the Vermont Department of Corrections was unable to access the images on Boucher's computer, which were stored in an encrypted drive called drive Z.
For more than a year, the government has not been able to see what is in drive Z, which is protected by an encryption program that is sold under the name Pretty Good Privacy, according to court records.
Pretty Good Privacy, which is more commonly known as PGP, is an industry standard of hard-drive encryption and email encryption, according to experts. Encryption is a complex, password-protected method of keeping information, hard drives, devices — almost anything — private.
"If you hand me someone's normal laptop, it is relatively easy to bypass passwords. All you have to do is rip out the hard drive out and put it into a different computer," said Charles Miller, a principal security analyst at Independent Security Evaluators and former employee of the National Security Agency. "PGP is full-disk encryption, which means the entire disk is encrypted and the only way in is to know the password. The program makes a key and that key is a password, without it you can't get into to the drive."
A desktop PC version of PGP is available for less than $200, and open-source (read: free) versions, sometimes called GPG, can be found online. Similar encryption services are also available in standard operating systems on PCs and Macs. Consumers often don't use them, however, because if they lose their password, there's no way to retrieve the protected information.
"People can't snoop because of strong encryption … It is similar to what protects your information and money at a bank," Miller said.
The software has proven to be instrumental in Boucher's case.
Secret Service Agent Matthew Fasvlo testified at a court hearing in 2007 that it is "nearly impossible" to access the encrypted files without the password.
"There are no 'back doors' or secret entrances to access the files. The only way to get access without the password is to use an automated system which repeatedly guesses passwords," Magistrate Judge Jerome Niedermeier, who was presiding over the case, wrote. "According to the government, the process to unlock drive Z could take years."
Jonathon Giffin, an assistant computer science professor at Georgia Tech, said without the password there was only one way to get into the computer: with "brute force."
"They start trying all possible passwords, hoping that they have passwords that you use," Giffin said. "The expected time it would take is years, decades, unless you have extremely powerful computers."
Even the FBI doesn't have that kind of computing power, according to Giffin.
"The FBI probably does not. The NSA probably does," he speculated. "That's really one of the NSA's jobs — to develop cryptosystems for our military as well as to crack the cryptosystems of other governments."
The government subpoenaed Boucher to try to force him to type in his password and give the government access to the computer.
In November, Niedermeier ruled that forcing Boucher to enter his password would violate his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
"If Boucher does know the password, he would be faced with the forbidden trilemma; incriminate himself, lie under oath, or find himself in contempt of court," the judge wrote.
In the 1990s, according to Virgil Gligor, an electrical and computer engineering professor at Carnegie Mellon University, the U.S. government attempted to prevent situations like Boucher's.
"In the late '90s, there was a government initiative, in which the government required any encryption mechanism to save keys [or passwords] and give keys to the government," Gligor said. "It failed."
Even since then, encryption programs have only improved.
"The quality of encryption that we have nowadays is actually … very good," Gilgor said.
Without that type of regulation proposed a decade ago, the government has been left with one option: to appeal the court's decision.
Russell Goldman contributed to this report.
________________________
Comment:
Shut down the people that provide this service to criminals.
________________________
The growing threat of keyloggers
February 12, 2008
daniweb.com
It might not be the typical bullets and bloodshed picture of gangland America, but it was enough to indict him for running an illegal gambling ring and loan sharking. The Magic Lantern recorded every keystroke made and sent the information to the
At the time the story raised a number of concerns about computer privacy. Now it serves as a useful reminder that there is a positive side to keylogging.
As well as serving the interests of law enforcement agents, keyloggers can help employers maintain productivity, protect valuable bandwidth and ensure optimum use of
But it is the darker side to these surveillance technologies that is more familiar to the majority of IT and security professionals.
By discovering user names, passwords and encryption codes from innocent users, keyloggers open up a whole world of extremely valuable information to thieves, who can plunder at will with very little chance of detection. Email addresses, instant messaging usernames, financial data and other sensitive details are all vulnerable to a keylogging attack.
Keyloggers are, therefore, ideal tools for industrial espionage or for accessing confidential corporate data. They can damage business relationships, financial standing, and reputation as a result. They can even cause an organisation to breach major pieces of legislation such as the Data
And it's not just large corporates that experience keylogging attacks. As more and more of us conduct our financial transactions online, our personal details are at risk from a carefully located keylogger. In fact, any individual or organisation that accesses, inputs or stores private information is at risk.
Logging the Keylogger
So how do keyloggers end up on our machines? Traditionally, keyloggers have been pieces of software, which can be installed on a computer through a virus or as
More recently, fake e-greetings cards were used to infect computers with keyloggers. When opened, the 'card' directed browsers to an exploit
For the criminals concerned, the advantage of the
Fortunately, it is also pretty straightforward to detect them. Anti-virus software that is kept up to date can prevent Trojans and spyware entering the system in the first place, particularly when anti-adware capabilities are added. And should a keylogger slip through the net, standard protection tools that monitor the status of a computer can detect and remove them.
Unfortunately, as software keyloggers get easier to identify, criminals find new ways to breach security measures.
Keylogger Technology
The latest breed of hardware keyloggers are much harder to detect since they do not install any code onto the machine and cannot be spotted by traditional anti-virus or anti-spyware tools. They are, therefore, becoming more common as determined criminals realise that the returns to be gained from software versions have diminished.
Hardware keyloggers take two main forms. The first, and probably the most common, is a small device installed at the back of a PC between the keyboard and its connection to the machine.
As with all hardware keyloggers, it requires the attacker to have physical access to the computer in question, both to install and later retrieve the device. With social engineering growing in sophistication, this doesn't pose a problem to the determined individual, particularly as it takes a matter of seconds to install, and requires no technical skill.
These kinds of keyloggers may only be approximately 1.5 inches long, but they have a
Happily, this type of hardware keylogger is also the easiest to detect visually - provided you know what to look for.
More insidious forms of keyloggers are built into the keyboard. Thieves will either replace the keyboard completely or dismantle it, insert a keylogging device, and re-assemble it. Naturally this requires a greater degree of skill on the part of the criminal, and takes more time to complete. But the chances of visual or manual detection are almost zero.
Fighting Back
The good news is that companies can protect themselves from keyloggers. First of all they should ensure that regular checks are conducted and comprehensive employee IT training is given to raise and maintain awareness of the issue.
Certainly in large organisations it isn't practical for the IT
Secondly, they should consider the type of equipment that is used in the organisation. Although not immune from hardware keyloggers, laptop
In addition, secure tokens and similar devices that are used to provide a second authentication factor, after user names and passwords, have a role to play. Because the token’s passcode constantly changes, any data that is gathered by a keylogger is immediately ineffectual. It cannot be used again to gain access to the system.
Organisations should also consider increasing the use of drop down menus for gathering information. Instead of typing in information with trackable keystrokes, drop downs enable users to select characters or words with the mouse, which a keylogger cannot record.
However, there are also a number of products that have recently come on to the market that automatically identify keyloggers. These software solutions can then disable the devices by intercepting and blocking communications to it from the targeted computer. The software also alerts the IT
Keyloggers are important because they highlight two key weaknesses of many IT security policies. The first is the reliance on passwords. No amount of sophisticated intrusion prevention or segmented access authorisation can counter a malicious user armed with a legitimate password.
The second area is that of old-fashioned physical security, a factor that can often be forgotten when devising strategies to protect virtual assets.
Although software keyloggers can be downloaded remotely and require no physical access to the machine to be infected, hardware keyloggers require the criminal to be in the presence of the targeted computer, even if it’s only for a matter of seconds.
Organisations therefore have to give the broadest possible definition to IT security to counter keylogging attacks. That means policies to help employees recognise social engineering attacks, and even conducting thorough background checks on auxiliary staff who have access to the building.
After all, if you think your data is important and worth protecting, the chances are that someone else will think it is worth stealing.

Comments